| Published
in "Electronic Security - 2001"
Check Fraud:
Just
the Cost of Doing Business? Or
Dereliction of Duty?
By
Paul Carrubba
Senior Vice President & Managing Director,Carreker
Corporation
New
developments are causing small
and mid-sized banks gear up, finally,
against check fraud:
- Check
fraud is rising about 15% a year
- outpacing check volume growth.
- Small
and mid-sized banks are increasingly
the targets of check fraud.
- Their
primary defense, signature verification,
is increasingly costly and ineffective.
- In
the event of fraud, they now
shoulder greater liability.
- Fraud
mitigation technology has been
scaled down to suite their needs
and budgets.
Criminals
are more wary of larger banks as
they implement new technology to
combat check fraud. Rather than
risk exposure from the new technology,
criminals tend to target institutions
without protection: Increasingly
that means small- to mid-size banks
that have not invested in fraud-prevention
technology.
Bankers
at smaller institutions often have
trouble justifying the cost of
fraud prevention strategies, but
that is often the result of not
having the tools available to adequately
gauge fraud losses. Many bankers
work hard to capture new customers,
cross-sell products and eke out
a slightly higher interest rate
without thinking of how those profits
can easily be lost through fraudulent
activity.
To
be fair, many mistakenly believe
that even with their best efforts,
they will detect and avoid only
a small proportion of attempted
fraud, and that attempts to prosecute
criminals will be even less effective.
Many believe that fraud mitigation
technology is affordable only for
the very large banks. Other banks
are simply not aware of how much
money they are losing to fraud
because they don’t track
fraud - and often, the fraud numbers
are categorized as “credit
losses.”
However,
technology has improved to the
point that much of today’s
check fraud can be detected and
avoided through cost-effective
PC technology. The bad news is
that criminals have better technology,
too. And they are increasingly
adept at targeting banks that are
less likely to have preventive
technology - community banks and
smaller regional banks.
The
statistics tell the worrisome story.
According to the American Bankers
Association fraud survey released
in December: Check fraud overall
rose 32% for the two-year period.
But it rose 35% at banks with less
than $500 million in assets, and
it rose a staggering 46% at banks
with $500 billion to $50 billion
in assets.
The
ABA acknowledges this trend was
unexpected. After all, large banks
had long been the best targets
for fraudsters because largeness
offers anonymity, whereas community
banks were more likely to recognize
their individual depositors.
But
the fact is, large banks have taken
many of the necessary steps to
mitigate their fraud losses. They
have invested in the technology.
They have done a better job of
prosecuting criminals. And they
have done a better job of sharing
information with other banks to
improve in both of these areas.
That
hasn’t stopped fraudulent
activity, though. According to
the ABA study, attempted check
fraud more than doubled from the
previous two-year period. All of
those attempts will go somewhere.
Large
banks’ investment holds a
lesson for smaller banks, now that
fraud is moving downstream: fraud
detection does pay. The ABA reports
that of the $2.2 billion in fraudulent
checks handled by banks in 1999,
check fraud losses at banks were
contained at $679 million.
Many
of the smaller banks increasingly
targeted by fraudsters still maintain,
as their main line of defense,
the practice of signature verification
- manual inspection of all checks
over a certain dollar size threshold.
But today there is little doubt
that signature verification alone
is bound to be insufficient.
Moreover,
as large check volumes cause banks
to increase the threshold of inspected
items, they open the window of
opportunity for criminals. Today,
many banks are setting their inspection
threshold as high as $100,000,
leaving them vulnerable to losses
that can easily wipe out hard-won
profits.
A
size threshold is hardly an indicator
of likelihood of fraud, though.
These banks are allocating costly
resources without regard to where
they are most likely to be successful.
When no information technology
alternatives existed, that was
understandable. But today, there
exist powerful repositories of
valuable information to indicate
probability and predictability
of check fraud.
Besides
losses, small and mid-sized banks
have an even greater incentive
to protect themselves. Today, the
standards of liability may be shifting
to reflect what technology has
made possible - the ability to
use historical information to predict
future instances of fraud, thus
reducing the number of checks to
be inspected.
Traditionally,
when a check fraud had been perpetrated,
the courts, in determining whether
the bank had exercised reasonable
commercial standards, would look
to see if the bank had some form
of signature verification. In the
future, signature verification
may no longer be considered sufficient.
Courts may expect banks to deploy
systems that have been proven more
effective at fraud prevention.
As a result, banks without such
protections may find themselves
liable for fraud losses that were
once passed on to customers.
As
fraud continues to increase, the
question for mid-to small-size
banks is not “can I afford
fraud detection technology?” but “can
I afford not to employ fraud detection
technology?”
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